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I am grateful to Professor Kyburg for taking the time to study my book Causality, and
for summarizing its main ideas in such an accurate and insightful way. I would like to
comment on one issue that Professor Kyburg considers central, and I consider tangential to
the study of causality—the distinction between relative frequencies and subjective beliefs.
True, frequencies are often the basis upon which beliefs are founded. Furthermore, fre-
quencies are arguably a proper model for the calculus of beliefs, belief combination, and
belief dynamics. That is why probability is rarely challenged as a representation of beliefs,
and when systematic disagreements are found experimentally, they evoke much surprise
and heated debates. However, the ultimate target of most tasks in artificial intelligence and
the cognitive sciences is not the frequencies themselves, as they appear in or inferred from
data, but the beliefs that those frequencies evoke or support.
As an example, unless you are a pollster or a public health administrator, your ultimate
interest in studying medical records is not the percentage of patients that were cured by a
certain drug but, rather, your belief that you, or your sick cousin will be cured by that drug.
It is those latter beliefs that we use to guide our decisions. It is those latter beliefs therefore
that we store in, and infer from our knowledge base—the frequencies serve merely as
temporary agents in forming those beliefs.
Thus, contrary to Kyburg’s assumption, my intent throughout Causality was to use
probabilities as representation of normative subjective beliefs. Therefore, it is perfectly
legitimate to claim that variances and distributions change in response to observations, and
that the conditioning operator stands for the sentence “given that we see”.
Still, readers who are more inclined to interpret Causality in the context of relative
frequencies will not have any difficulty making the translation. They should be willing to
concede though that relative frequencies do change in response to observations, because
observations redefine the relevant sample space.
I thank Professor Kyburg for the opportunity to discuss this issue. Additional discus-
sions of readers comments can be found on my website, http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-
2K/discussion.html.E-mail address: judea@cs.ucla.edu (J. Pearl).
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